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et al.: Due Process

DUE PROCESS
N.Y CoNsT. art. I § 6:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV: § 1
No State shall ... deprive to any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ....
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Morales 335
(decided December 17, 1992)
The defendant asserted that both his due process rights under
the Federal Constitution, 336 as well as his statutory rights
337
pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (C.P.L.) section 260.20,
were violated when he was not permitted to attend a proceeding
evaluating the testimonial capacity of a nine year old witness. 338
Moreover, defendant implicitly asserted violations of his due
process rights under the New York State Constitution. 339 In a
unanimous decision written by Judge Kaye, the New York Court
of Appeals rejected the defendant's claims and concluded that
335. 80 N.Y.2d 450, 606 N.E.2d 953, 591 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1992).

336. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ").
337. N.Y. CRi. PROC. LAw § 260.20 (McKinney 1993). The statute states
in pertinent part: "A defendant must be personally present during the trial of
an indictment....." Id.
338. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d at 452, 606 N.E.2d at 955, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
339. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.").

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1994], Art. 19

882

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 10

neither federal due process protection nor the state statute entitled
the defendant to be present at such an ancillary proceeding, as his
340
presence would not substantially further his own defense.
The defendant was indicted and subsequently convicted, inter
alia, of the rape and sodomy of his two stepchildren, E.T. and
R.H. 34 1 At the time of the trial, E.T. was thirteen and R.H. was
nine. 342 Criminal Procedure Law section 60.20(2)343 requires
that before a child below the age of twelve be permitted to testify
under oath, the court must first be satisfied that the child has the
ability to appreciate the nature of the oath. 344 Thus, because
R.H. was nine years old at the time of the trial, prior to allowing
R.H. to testify, the court conducted a competency hearing in
accordance with C.P.L. section 60.20(2).34 5 Although the
attorneys were not allowed to question R.H. directly, they were
346
allowed to submit questions to be asked.
The judge proceeded to assess R.H.'s ability to appreciate the
meaning of an oath. 347 The judge asked R.H. if she knew why
she was in court, what the distinction was between the truth and
lies, what were the consequences of lying, and the importance of
recounting only that of which she has personal knowledge. 34 8 In
addition, at defense counsel's request, the court asked R.H. if she
comprehended the roles of the judge, prosecutor, and defense
counsel.349
340. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d at 451, 606 N.E.2d at 954, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
341. Id. at 451-52, 606 N.E.2d at 954, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
342. Id.
343. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.20(2) (McKinney 1992). The statute
provides in pertinent part: "A child less than twelve years old may not testify
under oath unless the court is satisfied that he understands the nature of an
oath." Id.
344. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d at 452, 606 N.E.2d at 954, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
345. Id. at 452, 606 N.E.2d at 955, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
346. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d at 452, 606 N.E.2d at 955, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. None of the discourse in such a proceeding is considered
evidentiary testimony. Id. at 453, 606 N.E.2d at 955, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
However, if the court determines the child to be incapable of comprehending
the concept of an oath, the court may still permit the unsworn testimony to be
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Upon completion of the evaluation, the court concluded that
R.H. had demonstrated sufficient understanding of the oath to
offer sworn testimony. 350 Subsequently, the jury found the
defendant guilty of rape and sodomy. 35 1 The defendant appealed
asserting that his constitutional and statutory rights were violated
352
when he was excluded from R.H.'s competency proceeding.
The court addressed the state constitutional claim without
explicitly stating so. It explained that under state law, the
analysis "look[s] to the effect that defendant's absence might
have on the opportunity to defend." 353 The court concluded that
there was no state constitutional violation. 354 It reached its
conclusion by stating that the issue hinges upon whether the
proceeding is at a trial or is a pre-trial proceeding. 355 The court
explained that under state law, the defendant "usually has an
unfettered right to attend a trial.., but only a qualified right to
attend ancillary proceedings." 356 The court further explained that
a C.P.L. section 60.20 hearing is an ancillary part of the trial and
thus could have been conducted pre-trial. 357 Because the
proceeding in this case was in fact ancillary, the court's analysis
hinged upon whether the defendant's exclusion from the hearing
358
affected his ability to defend himself at trial.
The court believed that the United States Supreme Court
decision in Kentucky v. Stincer359 was persuasive authority for
used at trial if the court is satisfied that the child has sufficient intelligence and
capacity. Id. Yet, C.P.L. § 60.20(3) ensures that a defendant will not be
convicted of any offense based exclusively on this unsworn testimony. Id.;
C.P.L § 60:20(3) provides in pertinent part: "A defendant may not be
convicted of an offense solely upon unsworn evidence given pursuant to
subdivision two." N.Y. CRiM.

PROC. LAW

§ 60.20(3) (McKinney 1992).

350. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d at 452, 606 N.E.2d at 955, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
351. Id.
352. Id.

353. Id. at 456, 606 N.E.2d at 957, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
354. Id. at 457, 606 N.E.2d at 958, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

359. 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
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the state law analysis. 360 The court explained that in Stincer,
"[t]he hearing [at issue also] did not involve evidentiary
testimony or issues about which defendant has shown he had
special knowledge." 36 1
In People v. Mullen, 362 the court of appeals classified the scope
of a defendant's statutory and constitutional right to be present
during criminal proceedings. Pursuant to C.P.L. section
260.20,363 defendant's right to be present at the trial of an
indictment includes presence during voir dire, introduction of
evidence, summations of counsel, and the court's charge to the
jury. 364 These proceedings are considered to be part of the trial
because the defendant's presence is necessary to achieve just and
fair results. 365 In Mullen, the court held that defendant's
presence was not required at the hearing to determine potential
juror's qualifications because defendant's absence "did not affect
any substantial rights of the defendant." 366 Similarly, in People
v. Velasco, 367 the court stated that a defendant's right to be
present at the hearing of potential juror's qualifications was not
required because the issue was one solely for the court to
decide. 368
The court of appeals elucidated its analysis with examples of
ancillary proceedings that either included or excluded a
defendant's presence. 369 The court listed examples of when it
had permitted a defendant to be present, such as his Sandoval

360. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d at 457, 606 N.E.2d at 958, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
361. Id.
362. 44 N.Y.2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 369, 403 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1978) (holding that
defendant's absence from hearing questioning of juror's qualifications did not
constitute a constitutional due process violation on the ground that the hearing
did not amount to a critical part of trial).
363. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 260.20 (McKinney 1992).
364. Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d at 4, 374 N.E.2d at 370, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 5-6, 374 N.E.2d at 371, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
367. 77 N.Y.2d 469, 570 N.E.2d 1070, 568 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1991).
368. Id. at 472-73, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
369. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d at 456, 606 N.E.2d at 957-58, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
829-30.
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hearing 370 or pretrial suppression hearing. 37 1 The court
permitted the defendant to be present in those cases because, in
such situations, the defendant is the person who is most informed
to evaluate the issues presented. 372 In contrast, the court found
no advantage in allowing a defendant to attend a pre-charge
conference 373 or a colloquy concerning a read-back of jury
instructions conducted outside of the jury's presence 374 because
375
the defendant's presence would not aid his defense.

The court of appeals also addressed the defendant's assertion
that his federal due process. rights were violated when he was
excluded from the statutorily mandated proceeding of C.P.L.
section 60.20.376 In its analysis of this federal claim, the court
relied upon the Supreme Court's holding in Snyder v.
Massachusetts,377 which was reaffirmed 50 years later in
Kentucky v. Stincer.3 78 In Snyder, Justice Cardozo, writing the
370. Id. at 456, 606 N.E.2d at 958, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 830; see also People
v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656, 660, 595 N.E.2d 836, 839, 584 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764
(1992) (stating that defendant had the right to be present at Sandoval hearing
"to determine the extent to which the defendant, if he testifies, will be subject
to impeachment by cross-examination about prior bad acts").
371. Id.; see also People v. Anderson, 16 N.Y.2d 282, 287, 213 N.E.2d
445, 447, 266 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113 (1965) (stating that defendant's absence
from hearing on his motion to suppress certain evidence with regard to the
legality of the search and seizure warranted reversal of his conviction).
372. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d at 456, 606 N.E.2d at 958, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
373. Id. at 456, 606 N.E.2d at 957, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 829; see also People
v. Velasco, 77 N.Y.2d 469, 472, 570 N.E.2d 1070, 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d 721,
722 (1991) (holding that defendant has no constitutional right to be present at
pre-charge conference or side-bar voir dire because these matters involve
questions of law solely for the court to decide).
374. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d at 456, 606 N.E.2d at 958, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 830;
see also People v. Rodriguez, 76 N.Y.2d 918, 921, 564 N.E. 2d 658, 659,
563 N.Y.S,2d 48, 49 (1990) (stating that defendant's absence from a read-back
of jury instructions conducted outside the jury's presence did not violate
defendant's right to be present at trial because the read-back did not affect
defendant's ability to defend himself).
375. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d at 456, 606 N.E.2d at 957-58, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
829-30.
376. Id. at 452-53, 606 N.E.2d at 955, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
377. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
378. 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
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opinion of the Court, explained that due process requires a
defendant's presence "to the extent that a fair and just hearing
would be thwarted by his absence and to that extent only." 379
However, the defendant has no such entitlement if his "presence
would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow." 3 80 Fifty years
later, upholding the standard articulated in Snyder, the Supreme
Court in Stincer rejected the defendant's assertion that he had a
constitutional right to attend a proceeding in which the
testimonial capacity of two children was assessed. 381 The Court
reasoned that the proceeding contained neither substantive
testimony, nor any indication that the defendant's presence would
have enhanced the competency determination. 382
Applying the same analysis as that used in Stincer, the court of
appeals found no merit to the defendant's contention that he had a
federal due process right to attend the C.P.L. section 60.20
proceeding. 383 First, the court of appeals ruled that the hearing
involved no substantive testimony. 3 84 Second, the court gave no
credence to the defendant's assertions that his relationship and
familiarity with R.H. would have contributed to a more accurate
assessment of her competence to testify. 385 Moreover, the court
advised that, if in fact the defendant did have special knowledge,
he could have allowed his attorney to raise that knowledge during
the hearing as well as the cross-examination at trial. 3 86 The court
of appeals stated that permitting the defendant to attend the
competency proceeding would have been "useless, or the benefit
but a shadow.' 387
Significantly, the court of appeals recognized that the defendant
is guaranteed a comparable breadth of due process protection

379. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 108.
380. Id. at 106-07.
381. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 744.
382. Id. at 745-47.

383. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d at 455, 606 N.E.2d at 957, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
384. Id. at 454, 606 N.E.2d at 956, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
385. Id. at 455, 606 N.E.2d at 956, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
386. 80 N.Y.2d at 455, 606 N.E.2d at 956, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 828.

387. Id. at 455, N.E.2d at 957, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 829 (citations omitted).
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Federal Constitution 388 and the New York State

Constitution. 3 8 9

Both

the

state

and

federal

due

process

protections governing ancillary trial proceedings are evaluated by
the standard articulated in Snyder: whether the defendant's
presence will contribute to his defense. 3 9 0 The court of appeals
noted that there have been occasions in which it has afforded the

defendant greater due process rights than those guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution. 3 9 1 However, under both a state and federal

due process analysis, a defendant has no right to attend a
proceeding which evaluates the testimonial capacity of a
witness.

3 92

393

People v. Outley
(decided February 16, 1993)

In separate actions decided as companion cases, the defendants
in Outley, Maietta and Ogtong contested enhanced criminal
sentences imposed against them for violating no-arrest conditions
in their plea agreements. 3 94 Defendants claimed that when a

defendant denies post-plea criminal conduct, in keeping with the
state395 and federal396 constitutional requirements of due process,

the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the
validity of the defendant's post-plea arrest. 3 9 7 The New York
388. 80 N.Y.2d at 457,. 606 N.E.2d at 958, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. See, e.g., People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247, 250, 804 N.E.2d
95, 97, 590 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (1992) (stating that a court may conduct side-bar
conferences in defendant's absence in order to determine a juror's testimonial
capacity but may not look into a potential juror's "ability to weigh the evidence
objectively unless defendant is present"); People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656,
656, 595 N.E.2d 836, 836, 584 N.Y.S.2d 761, 761.
392. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d at 457, 606 N.E.2d at 958, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
393. 80 N.Y.2d 702, 610 N.E.2d 356, 594 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1993).
394. Id. at 707, 610 N.E.2d at 358, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
395. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.").
396. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . .

").

397. Outley, 80 N.Y.2d at 712, 610 N.E.2d at 361, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
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